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Abstract 
How is a citizen living under a merciless totalitarianism such as the Nazi but opposed to its philosophies 
expected to respond to the law? Where does his primary obligation as a citizen reside? Is it to the laws of the 
land that command total submission or to his convictions by which he is convinced that the system is totally 
unjust? Does one have a moral obligation to always obey the law? Conversely, should one obey an unjust law?  
Obviously, such an individual like Antigone in ancient Greece is naturally torn between two loyalties. (Note 1)If 
he obeys the law, he would be guilty of knowingly aiding to sustain an unjust system. If he follows his moral 
judgment and violate the law, he would be charged with the penalty stipulated in the law.  
Keywords: Just Laws, Unjust Laws, Civil Disobedience 
Introduction 
It is heartbreaking to read about Hitler’s atrocious reign in Germany. Nazism had a strict hierarchical 
classification of the human race with the Aryan people or master race (white European origin) at the top and 
Untermenschen or sub humans (non-Aryan/white European origin) at the lowest level. (Note 2)The 
Untermenschen were inferior and seen as dangerous to the society. The killing of Jews, Gypsies, people with 
disabilities, Jehovah Witnesses, homosexuals, etc was according to this philosophy in line with Rassenhygiene or 
racial hygiene, thus justified because it purportedly eliminated danger, the mentally ill and the disabled thus 
sparring state institutions huge maintenance costs.(Note 3) This may all sound perplexing to us today, yet, 
interestingly, “everything Adolf Hitler did in Germany was ‘legal’ and everything the Hungarian freedom 
fighters did in Hungary was ‘illegal’.”(Note 4) It was also ‘illegal’ to aid and comfort a Jew in Hitler's Germany. 
(Note 5) 
How is a citizen living under a merciless totalitarianism such as the Nazi but opposed to its philosophies 
expected to respond to the law? Where does his primary obligation as a citizen reside? Is it to the laws of the 
land that command total submission or to his convictions by which he is convinced that the system is totally 
unjust? Does one have a moral obligation to always obey the law? Conversely, should one obey an unjust law? 
Obviously, such an individual like Antigone in ancient Greece is naturally torn between two loyalties.(Note 6) If 
he obeys the law, he would be guilty of knowingly aiding to sustain an unjust system. If he follows his moral 
judgment and violate the law, he would be charged with the penalty stipulated in the law.  
Given that the resolution of every problem requires first that the problem be understood, I will begin by briefly 
highlighting some historical instances of civil disobedience that will form the basis of this paper. Antigone’s 
beloved brother was charged by Creon the king with treason. According to law, his corpse as punishment was to 
be left in the open, unburied, outside the city walls for eagles, dogs and vultures to eat it.  She was required by 
her religion on the other hand to bury and mourn her dead brother. (Note 7) Upon consideration, she chose to 
follow her conscience and pay the penalty with her life. Conversely, Adolf Eichmann, an extremely submissive 
Second World War German veteran so “conform[ed] to the law as to compromise the individual’s responsibility 
for developing and living in a way consonant with truth, justice, and love for fellow man.” (Note 8) Socrates 
defiled the law and exercised his professed “freedom of speech.” He peacefully accepted to drink the poison as 
required by the laws of Athens. (Note 9) 
Gandhi inspired a large-scale resistance against the British colonial rule in India, because the latter unjustly 
“maintained a ruinously costly civil and military administration, destroyed indigenous industries and 
de-industrialised India, ignored its agricultural development, caused massive unemployment and famine and in 
general exploited it.” (Note 10) Moreover, the British “sapped the foundations of Indian civilization, 
de-nationalised the Indians, ridiculed their society and religion, and foisted their values on them.” (Note 11)  
In United States of America (USA), the segregation laws called Jim Crow laws decreed a society of “separate 
but equal” services for whites and coloured peoples. In reality, this was not an arrangement of racial separation 
but instead a system of white supremacy, secured by terror. (Note 12) Civil rights activists such as martin Luther 
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King Jr. and Malcolm X engaged the so-called American Negroes in various campaigns of civil disobedience, 
albeit with different orientations. Decades earlier, even before King and Malcolm X, Thoreau(Note 13) had 
refused to pay the Massachusetts poll tax in protest of the government’s support of chattel slavery and its 
invasion of Mexico. Taxes in his opinion were illegally and immorally imposed in order to assist the 
enforcement of these acts. (Note 14) 
To say the least thus, the question whether one is bound to always obey the law is increasingly important during 
periods of grossly immoral legislations and unjust institutions. (Note 15) The law is a teacher and its supposed 
utility is to the greatest good. Just as street signs guide all cars and pedestrians on the highway to drive or walk in 
a particular direction, the law has a corresponding responsibility to walk the society towards a path of equity. But 
law in itself does not mark the end of the road. It only points the way to justice. (Note 16) My contention in this 
paper is that in cases of gross immorality, illegality and disregard to the tenets of fairness, the law cannot be 
perceived as acting as a teacher. 
I. What Civil Disobedience Is and What It Is Not 
A simplistic definition of civil disobedience provides that it is an “illegal activity undertaken to protest laws that 
are regarded as unjust.” (Note 17) The act usually takes the form of a “deliberate and open violation of law with 
the intent, within the framework of the prevailing form of government, to protest a wrong or to accomplish some 
betterment in the society.” (Note 18) The purpose is to purify the legal system of “unjust laws and practices.” 
(Note 19) The violations have the effect of creating a tension as well as forcing a community that has constantly 
refused to negotiate to finally confront the issues. (Note 20)  It is an open defiance of the law irrespective of 
whether the act itself will be vindicated through the legal system. (Note 21) By dramatizing the issue, public 
attention is drawn to the alleged injustice, such that it can no longer be ignored. (Note 22) Thus, the open nature 
of the violation is an invitation for others to join in such violation. (Note 23) Another reason for the openness of 
the act is based on the fact that the dissenters' main interest is to see a change in an unjust institution. They see 
their violation as a civic act that properly fit into the public life of the community; or as acting to help thwart 
some laws or policies that have deviated from the true purpose of government. (Note 24)  
The openness of the violation for the most part is a tactic in itself, given that a stimulated public sentiment may 
just be everything they need. Bad laws would eventually lose their influence hence injustice prevented from 
occuring where the hearts and minds of people are changed against them. King was quickly bailed out of 
Birmingham jail (even without applying for one) because the authorities feared the publicity that his arrest was 
generating. (Note 25) Persuation although far from being an exclusive method is considered to be a very 
effective means of civil disobedience. Abraham Lincoln once remarked that “with public sentiment, nothing can 
fail, without it, nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who moulds public sentiment goes deeper than he who 
enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed.” 
(Note 26) It is therefore important to the dissenters that both the public and the government know of their act, 
because at the end of the day, it is the government that would change the challenged policies or laws. (Note 27) 
Public sympathy would evidently be useful in precipitating this occurrence. 
Civil disobedience is different from evasion of law. Unlike the civil disobedient, the law evader attempts to 
conceal his violation and the penalties of the law. A good example of a law evader is the case of a militia or 
mafia that musters and hoards enough weapons to overpower agencies of law enforcement, and elude 
punishment by carrying out unauthorized activities. (Note 28) A traffic violator who tries to dodge and do away 
with his crime is also an evader and not a civil disobedient. The Law evader does not at all think of himself as 
committing an act of civil disobedience. Evasion of the law is however not always wrong. Take for instance the 
case of a citizen who violates the apartheid decrees in South Africa, Nazism in Germany or the American 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. Today, we can concur that such violations were warranted. Most importantly, 
protesters engaged in civil disobedience strongly nurse the conviction that a specific law is illegal, 
unconstitutional or unjust. They thus deliberately violate it as an effective way of getting it declared illegal. 
(Note 29) Civil disobedience however excludes people who unconsciously violate an unjust law. 
Framing the Inquiry 
This paper critically explores the dilemmas facing the legal order when individuals deliberately violate the law 
because it conflicts with their good conscience. The debate over the justification of civil disobedience 
specifically rests on the conflict between those postulating an absolute submission to the law at all times 
(whether or not these laws are just or unjust) and those postulating obedience to the law only if it is sufficiently 
backed by a moral condition. Looking back, violations seem today to have been warranted by Antigone, Socrates, 
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Eichmann, or a dissenting citizen who lived in atrocious Nazi Germany, Apartheid South Africa, Jim Crow 
America or colonized Africa.  
My purpose is however not to devise a general theory of moral responsibility as such, but instead to articulate 
various scenarios under which resort to civil disobedience can be justified. Even here, I will shy away from 
suggesting any hard and fast rule given that the categories of rights violation and lawlessness can never be closed, 
nor are they calculable by any simple formula. The attributes of justice are a subject on which philosophers and 
scholars constantly disagree about its true nature.(Note 30) The same goes for the scope of civil disobedience.  
Thoreau, Gandhi and King are very closely related with the concept of civil disobedience as used in everyday 
speech. (Note 31) Amongst the many attributes they shared in common, they all strongly believed that their 
systems were unjust and required fundamental transformation. Neither did they think there was any moral 
obligation for them to observe unjust laws. As a result, they were prepared to accept the legal penalties that 
accompanied their violations. (Note 32) Gandhi and King especially advocated for non-violence direct action as 
a means of resisting unjust laws. Many authors have since restricted their analysis of civil disobedience to 
“nonviolent” protests. (Note 33) This paper considers such an assumption to be as pretentious as its imprecision. 
There is no convincing basis for the restriction to just this one species of principled resistance. (Note 34) Their 
resort to nonviolence reflected their moral and religious judgments, but clearly not the end of the road on the 
subject.  
Despite the unquestionable relevance of Thoreau, Gandhi and King, it would be an academic scandal to discredit 
or take no notice of the immense contributions of historical movements and figures such as nationalist struggles, 
freedom fighters, Che Guevara, Malcolm X and Nelson Mandela, all of whom advocated for other methods other 
than nonviolence (mostly to a successful degree) to also thwart the unjust laws and policies in their systems. The 
USA is an example of a country that was founded on rebellion. It wasn’t nonviolent, yet it liberated the West 
Indies from British colonization. The same is true for all those heroes who revolted against chartered slavery, 
imperialism and segregation statutes. In a nutshell, civil disobedience is still a concept in search of limits. (Note 
35) Dissenters have been an invaluable feature of many constructive revolutions in human history. Apartheid in 
South Africa was cruised through the peoples’ revolt; the colonized peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America 
were liberated through rebellions, etc. Civil disobedience is a useful and necessary purpose to induce change in 
an unjust society where traditional means are inadequate, unable or unwilling to correct a brutally unjust system. 
(Note 36) 
Social Contract Theory 
The history of the world from the perspective of Social Contract theorists can be divided into two clear periods 
to wit: the period before and the period after the state. In the first period, there is no government or law (state of 
nature). In the second, there is a contract between the subjects in nature (that is, the government and the people). 
According to John Locke, the raison-d’être of establishing a government was to move men away from a state of 
nature, given that men in the state of nature were too often judges in their own cases. A civil society was vital to 
guarantee peace and a common judge to settle disputes for everyone. The constitution and institutions of 
government are in place to ensure that individuals conform to the dictates of reason and justice since “the 
passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint”.(Note 40)  
The Social Contract theorists thus supposedly shared a radically democratic understanding of “the people” that 
constituted the contractual relationship. (Note 41) Any disconnect in that relationship has been  mirrored with 
qualified adjectives such as “invasion of rights”, “usurpation”, “and betrayal of trust”, “mutual covenant”, “and 
state of nature”, “social contract and the dissolution of government”. (Note 42) Thomas Hobbes contended that 
the sovereigns were the beneficiaries of the “contractual authorization”, while John Locke added that the nature 
of the relationship between the sovereign and the people was one of trust not contract. (Note 43) Moreover, 
Locke contended that the fundamental rights actually belonged to man by nature and the state was credited with 
a trust that these rights shall not be taken away, and if the rulers committed a breach of trust, then the people 
were justified to take away the powers from the ruler. (Note 44) 
The significance of this theory lies in its assumption that the civil society is based on consent. It instills the view 
that the state is a “contractual” servant and not the master of the people. The contract is only valid for as long as 
the state honours its servitude to the people. Consequently, whenever any form of government becomes vi cious 
(betrayal of trust), it is the right of the people in the interest of the society to take back the power they have 
entrusted on it. 
DEMOCRACY AS SOCIAL CONTRACT 
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The ideals of democracy are very closely related with the basic fundamentals of the social contract theory. A 
democracy to quote its founding father, Abraham Lincoln, is a “government of the people, by the people and for 
the people.” (Note 45) A democratic regime as a result gets its governing mandate from a majority of the 
populace through a free and fair election. By casting their ballots or votes, the citizens are in effect expressing 
their consent to the authority of the winning majority to legitimately act on behalf. It follows that an 
administrator is stricto sensu a servant assigned to manage something in the interest of the community. (Note 46) 
Characteristically, a democratic culture emphasizes participation of all citizens, observance of the rule of law, 
equality of all citizens, right to assemble, education, the building of self confidence and a sense of somebodiness.  
The above characteristics presuppose that the people that must obey the law in a democracy have naturally been 
consulted, and have the legal channels through which they could express their protests and to work for reform. 
(Note 47) If the regime vitiates their consent or fail to recognize the basic rights of everyone in the society 
including the minority, such a regime can be said to be undemocratic, because it has betrayed the trust that the 
people collectively bestowed on it. (Note 48) Such is the case with an administration with a reputation of bad 
faith, manipulations and dishonesty of those or a cross section of those it administers. It is not uncommon to 
witness a situation in which administrative officials mistake between God and themselves, are dictatorial and 
arrogant, serve their own personal interests instead of that of the community. (Note 49) In a political system that 
is democratic, we expect to see an administration that is responsive to the needs of the citizens, is accountable to 
the people who in turn can democratically elect and fire any administration as they please. (Note 50) 
There seems to be a good deal of distress amongst scholars regarding the upsetting paradox of American 
democracy throughout the 19th century and first half of the 20th century. Although America has always been 
regarded as the undisputed seat of democracy, it is anything but shameful and embarrassing that for so long it 
preached one thing to the world only to turn around and practice the opposite. All agencies of administration 
brutally sanctified a society of free persons and slaves. To quote one scholar, “[Citizenship in] America has in 
principle always been democratic, but only in principle. From the first the most radical claims for freedom and 
political equality were played out in counterpoint to chattel slavery, the most extreme form of servitude, the 
consequences of which still haunt us.” (Note 51) She was referring to the frustrating denial of basic rights to 
blacks or so-called Negroes living in a country that relentlessly professed to be the powerhouse of democracy. 
The paradox of American hypocrisy is even more disturbing when we consider the basic principles on which its 
“democratic” institutions were built on. When the forefathers of American independence threw off their 
allegiance to Great Britain, one observer has pointed out,   they “founded a republic of the United States, they 
announced to the world certain political ideas, all of which they firmly believed, but very few of which they 
ventured to put in practice.” (Note 52) “They declared that all men are created equal, and endowed by their 
creator with the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, that government is constituted 
amongst men for the sole purpose of securing these rights, that it derives its just powers from the consent of the 
governed, and that, failing to accomplish the high purpose for which it is established, it becomes the duty of the 
people to alter or destroy it.” (Note 53) 
On the one hand, the US government alleged to be committed to the rule of law. In practice however, she 
sanctioned the brutal, systematic denial of civil rights to African Americans. (Note 54) Local officials were 
indifferent to the state of injustice and would rarely interfere with, no less prosecute violence against Blacks; 
instead, they were frequently involved in many of the discriminatory atrocities. Neither was there any 
determined interference from the federal government. Faced with perpetual prejudice, the rule of law became a 
false promise to most African-Americans. (Note 55) 
II. The Case for Civil Disobedience 
The concept of civil disobedience confronts us with a paradox as it calls for the open violation of a given law. 
Going back to the citizen torn between two loyalties, notably the law and his conscience, two conflicting schools 
of thought have afforded different answers to the problem. One is to the effect that civil disobedience is 
incompatible with legal institutions, and that obedience to the law is a civic obligation, until such a time when 
the law is changed by an appropriate constitutional process. The other asserts that only just laws should be 
obeyed. Although both assertions have plausible claims, I argue that a rigid supposition of civic obligation to 
always obey the law is morally flawed. 
Let me begin the section by examining the claim postulating for an absolute obligation to always obey the law. It 
has been observed and rightly too that the law can never make provision for its violation except to hold the 
offender liable for punishment. (Note 56) In other words, it is not possible to have a law to which obedience is 
optional. (Note 57) To this effect, one proponent has advanced four considerations to justify a  supposedly 
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political obligation to obey all laws, irrespective of whether they are just or unjust, namely: “(a) disobedience 
undermines public order; (b) there is an implied contract to obey the laws, just or unjust; (C) there is a debt due 
the state that can only be met by obedience, and (d) if the state offers opportunity to be convinced of its wrong 
and one fails, he should obey.” (Note 58)  
Advocates of a political obligation to obey all laws sometimes anchor their base on Socrates’ refusal to flee the 
Athenian prison into exile, even when an opportunity reportedly emerged to do so. (Note 59) Instead, he 
submitted himself to the fate of Athenian law by drinking poison. This is at best a controversial argument, 
considering that when Socrates in defiance of the law continued to exercise his professed right to free speech, he 
was by so doing actually practicing civil disobedience. His paradoxical adherence to laws that  he so fervently 
opposed can be understood in the light of his conviction that the needed change would be accomplished only by 
working through the system. By all intents and purposes, the contention of advocates of political obligation is 
that no legal system can carry on where each individual is free to pick and chose which laws to obey and which 
to disobey. Were this to be the case, the result may be violence, chaos or a total breakdown of the rule of 
law.(Note 60) Let me also point out that there is usually just as much a strong argument for total submission to 
laws in a “democracy” as it is in a tyranny. For the most part, the claims tend to be as pretentious as they are 
misleading. Let’s take for illustration the interpretation of the democratic concept of majority rule by one of such 
arguments: “[The concept of democracy rests on the assumption that] ‘almost without exception individuals will 
accept the will of the majority even when to do so is grudging and distasteful’…” (Note 61) 
The above claim represents a distorted conception of a democratic majority. As noted before, a democratic 
culture is one that besides ensuring a free and fair election for all eligible voters emphasizes participation, 
observance of the rule of law, equality of all citizens, right to assemble, education, the building of self 
confidence and a sense of somebodiness. It is not enough to have a majority. It must be backed by a just, 
democratic institutional process. Even though all democratic regimes come to the office through a majority, not 
all majority rule are however democratic.  
This leads us to the second arm of the debate namely that only just laws should be obeyed. As we have just seen, 
there can be a very sound argument for a political obligation to always obey the law.  However, those same 
arguments can become victims of their own very postulations, because law is not absolute. The rigorous 
character of a democratic culture implies that law is only supreme for as long as it is just, grounded on rules of 
fair play and not contrary to good faith. Just laws merit respect. The reverse is true of unjust laws. (Note 62) It is 
also not enough to preach principles. They must be backed by a committed intent to enforce them. Although 
President Kennedy often expressed signs of sympathy from the sidelines to the “Negro” demonstrations, he 
nevertheless came under fierce criticism from civil rights activists for his inactions. (Note 63) ¨The betterment of 
a society is first and foremost an ethical venture, and “ethical conduct is above all a practical affair. It requires 
not only meaning well but also doing well.” (Note 64) 
Lets reconsider the examples of Nazi Germany, Apartheid South Africa, Jim Crow America, all of which openly 
discriminated and excluded a significant portion of the population from the political process based on race. 
Because of these exclusions, the majority rule (or minority rule in the case of South Africa) was undemocratic in 
practical sense. Not only were they authoritarian, they also sustained their rule by acts unworthy of a democratic 
culture. However stable and effective a majority rule, there can never be a democratic right to commit torture, 
genocide, holocaust, racism, segregation, etc. These acts are by their very nature, atrocious and contrary to the 
spirit of rule of law or democratic values. In such regimes, the duty to always comply with the law is obviously 
problematic for minorities who have never known anything else but injustice. 
Civil disobedience is a direct challenge to the notion that a majority is always right, and as a consequence the 
minority must accept their will. There is a gist of truth in the assertion though, in that a democratic government 
once elected governs on behalf of all citizens, including those who voted against it. (Note 65) It would be 
unrealistic to expect every governmental decision to win the unanimity or approval of all the populace. Thomas 
Jefferson in his inaugural address of 1801 laid down an unqualified obligation to submit to the decisions of the 
majority, for as he put it: “absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority [is]-the vital principle of 
republics, from which there is no appeal but to force…”(Note 66) A similar insistence on political obligation to 
laws at all cost was later adopted by Charles Evans Whittaker, the former conservative US Supreme Court 
Justice who blasted the civil rights movement thus: 
While I do not claim that all of our crime is due to any one cause, it seems rather clear that a large part of the 
current rage and rapid spread of lawlessness in our land has been at least, fostered and inflamed by the 
preachments of self appointed leaders of minority groups to 'obey the good laws, but to violate the bad ones' 
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-which, of course, simply advocates violation of laws they do not like, or, in other words, the taking of laws into 
their own hands. (Note 67) 
The above arguments are clearly misguided given that they not only silence the minority voice but also raise 
those in power to a status equal to or above the law. They are passionate adherents of majority rule, but not 
necessarily a democratic rule nor the rule of law or equity. Moreover, it is at best controversial who is actually 
showing greater respect for the law-justice. Is it the civil disobedient who is committed to get rid of an unjust 
system or the segregationist who through cruel deliberate tactics enslaves and torment other members of his 
society. I submit that the segregationist actually poses the most threat the law because unlike the civil 
disobedient, the last thing he wants in his society is justice. Abraham Lincoln adopted a more modest position, 
even offering some soft support for civil disobedience when he addressed the same issue some three decades 
after Jefferson, before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois:  
“…Let every man remember that to violate the law is to trample on the blood of his father, and to tear the charter 
of his own and his children’s liberty…And in short, let it become the political religion of the nation…When I so 
pressingly urge a strict observance of all the laws, let me not be understood as saying there are no bad laws, or 
that grievances may not arise for the redress of which no legal provisions have been made. I mean to say no such 
thing. But I do mean to say that although bad laws, if they exist, should be repealed as soon as possible, still, 
while they continue in force, for the sake of example they should be religiously observed…”(Note 68) 
Their variations notwithstanding, the pronouncements of Jefferson, Whittaker and Lincoln nonetheless have a 
common denominator which is the insistence on the fact that chaos would reign if every citizen is allowed to 
pick and choose what laws to obey and what to disobey. A parallel argument can be advanced that discrimination 
inevitably breeds chaos. Civil disobedience is warranted for a society that is so sick with injustice and law 
enforcement is deliberately poor---one that arbitrarily picks and chooses which citizens to benefit from the 
national cake, and which to be sidelined. Protest movements necessarily reflect crises in law enforcement. (Note 
69) Racial disharmony undoubtedly threatens many institutions. (Note 70) King famously observed that injustice 
anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. (Note 71) Far from the assertions of Jefferson and Whittaker, an act 
of civil disobedience does not cast doubt on one’s patriotism or even respect to the law. Instead, where the act is 
fittingly justified, it rather strengthens and reaffirms the principles of democratic governance upon which a free 
society is based. (Note 72) Anyone who does not agree at this point that laws can sometimes be blatantly unjust 
would as well find absolutely nothing absurd about the cruelty of the Nazi regime. 
It is also imperative to understand the philosophy and techniques of those challenging the law. Perhaps the most 
eloquent basis for civil disobedience has been advanced by King and Malcolm X. Let me begin with King. In his 
Letter From only put forward a sharp condemnation of Jim Crow but moreover advanced a strong moral 
justification for disobeying unjust laws: 
“An Individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and willingly accepts the penalty…to arouse 
the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the very highest respect for the 
law…It was ‘illegal’  to aid and comfort a Jew in Hitler’s Germany. But I am sure that if I had lived in 
Germany during that time I would have …comforted…the Jewish people.” (Note 73) 
King went on to suggest four necessary steps or requirements which he supposed should be at the basis of every 
civil disobedience. The first step is the collection of facts to determine whether injustice exists. The next steps 
involve negotiation; self-purification and direct action. He observed that blacks had gone through all those steps 
in Birmingham.(Note 74) In addition, King asserted, civil disobedients should demonstrate their respect for the 
legal order in place by breaking the law openly, lovingly and with the willingness to accept the penalty.(Note 75) 
King’s philosophy perceives laws not as ends in themselves but rather means of achieving justice. (Note 76) 
In order to buttress his proposition, he offers three definitions of just and unjust laws. First, he asserted, “a Just 
law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of 
harmony with the moral law.” (Note 77) Secondly, “an unjust law is any law forced on a minority not followed 
also by the majority. And third, an unjust law is any law that a minority had no voice in making.” (Note 78) 
There could actually be as many definitions of just and unjust laws as there writers on the subject. Whichever 
way we look at it, there can be no denying the fact that segregation, Aryan and apartheid laws are unjust by all 
counts.  There can also be no denying the fact that any law construed with bad faith is bad law. In line with 
Saint Augustine who posited that “an unjust law is no law at all”, King arrived at a parallel conclusion that one 
has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. (Note 79) 
Apparently, there was no limit to King’s nonviolence philosophy in conflict situations. (Note 80) Its persuasion 
and moral vigor notwithstanding, King’s philosophy would be unrealistic in every circumstance if not most 
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situations. It fuels the desired pressure against a prevailing state of injustice but does very little to prevent the 
actual commission of evil. A nonviolent movement could not have halted Hitler’s army or evil ambitions. (Note 
81) In fact, even until this day, the concepts of violence and nonviolence are still hotly debated topics. Each of 
them, if well-grounded can serve as an anchor to any civil disobedience campaign. Nothing in the philosophy of 
civil disobedience precludes resort to violence, if it is deemed as the only means to bring about a just society. 
(Note 82) 
Malcolm X, another prominent civil rights activist against Jim Crow for instance rejected the nonviolent 
philosophy as an “uncle Tom” philosophy of a fool, opting for a more involved position. In direct contrast to 
King and his nonviolent philosophy, Malcolm X conceived retaliatory violence or self defense as a necessary 
response to criminal acts of whites on blacks. (Note 83) At the widely televised Oxford Union debate in 1964, 
Malcolm X argued in favour of the proposition that extremism in defense of liberty is no vice, and moderation in 
the pursuit of justice is no virtue. (Note 84)  
Malcolm X did not expressly advocate for violence; he mainly justified the right of self defense. Indeed, in the 
course of the Oxford debate, he insisted that he did not believe in any form of extremism. He nevertheless 
recognised that when a man is exercising extremism in the defense of liberty for human beings that cannot be 
considered to be a vice. By the same token, if a man is moderate in defense of justice for human beings, then that 
individual is equivalent to a sinner or a coward.(Note 85) The lives of blacks were dire and pathetic caused by 
centuries of white racism, segregation and discrimination. As Malcolm X also pointed out, the American 
government and all its agencies of law enforcement were indifferent, hypocritical, direct or indirect 
co-conspirators to white supremacy groups committing unspeakable atrocities on blacks. Blacks in America, he 
contended were faced with a racialistic society, a society which at every echelon was both deceitful and 
deceptive. Contrary to King, Malcolm X saw the eye-for-an-eye principle as a necessary and most effective 
means to bring about the much needed change. That is, speaking the same language so that the racialist could 
understand. The whole talk of nonviolence was an alien language to the violent racialists in the same way that 
French, Finnish, Arabic, Russian, German or Swahili is foreign to an American.  
Moderate whites admonishing blacks to stick to the nonviolent campaign in order to gain their civil rights were 
wretched hypocrites because of the contradiction with how they acted when whites felt that their rights had been 
violated. They do not “advocate turning the other cheek or kneeling down to pray. Because whites did not apply 
to themselves the same moral logic they urged upon blacks, Malcolm regarded them as the worst hypocrites on 
the planet” (Note 86).  Whites, Malcolm observed recognized self-defense as an inherent right, but not for 
blacks. (Note 87) What is good for the goose is surely good for the gander. If whites had a right to defend 
themselves against their enemies, the same could be expected from blacks. It is important that a civil disobedient 
movement employs maximum care in order to avoid a state of lawlessness or an anarchical situation that may 
diminish its usefulness. After all, its primordial goal is to attain a positive action to better both the law and its 
enforcement. (Note 88) Even though it may be a sane thing for a civil disobedience movement to stay as 
nonviolent as possible, it must also be observed that they naturally retain an inherent right of self defense. 
Malcolm X did not think the problem was one of lack of laws but rather the unwillingness to enforce the laws or 
commit to justice. Blacks were at the mouth of the whites’ hitting hammer. It is they (blacks) who had their 
skulls crushed, not only by the ku klux klan, but also by policeman, all because they wanted to have the laws 
enforced. They were accustomed to having water-hoses turned on their backs, practically so hard that it ripped 
off their clothes, etc. (Note 89) Malcolm also observed that blacks like Hamlet in William Shakespeare were 
faced by the dilemma “whether it was nobler in the mind of man to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous 
fortune in moderation, or to take arms against a sea of troubles and by opposing end them” to which he laid a 
classic caveat at the Oxford debate to thunderous applause that “any time you live in a society supposedly based 
upon laws and it doesn’t enforce its own law because the color of a man’s skin happens to be wrong, then I say 
those people are justified to resort to any means necessary to bring about justice where the government can’t 
give them justice.” (Note 90)  
We have just seen how King and Malcolm X approached civil disobedience from two contrasting dimensions. 
My interest here is not to adopt one of these approaches over the other but rather to illustrate the deficiencies and 
in-exhaustiveness of studies that have restricted their analysis of civil disobedience to “nonviolent” protests. 
(Note 91) Whichever way we appreciate the philosophies of king and Malcolm X, there can be no denying the 
fact that it is their combined revolutionary tactics that immensely contributed to the final tearing down of the 
ugly Jim Crow curtains across America. The deconstruction of their varying philosophies has demonstrated that 
the decision to result to civil disobedience is a composite judgment that cannot be calculable by one single 
formula. Not even Thoreau, generally recognized as one of the forerunners in the discipline attached any 
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stringent nonviolent character to it. Victims of oppression or an unjust system are free to employ different means 
in order to bring about lasting justice. It can be directly or indirectly. For instance, it may be directly as in the 
case of violating an objectionable law and indirectly by violating some other law. (Note 92) 
Another drawback of studies that approach civil disobedience solely from a nonviolent perspective is their 
insistence that the violator must gracefully accept punishment. The refusal of Socrates to flee the Athenian jail 
and King’s Letter From Birmingham Jail are the two main grounds on which such arguments are anchored. 
(Note 93) These arguments are anything but an over-stretch of standard. In fact, there is no convincing basis why 
we should embrace this standard as a hard and fast rule. There is no doubt that civil disobedience is a 
self-limiting phenomenon since only a fraction of peoples would have the courage to face the resulting penalties 
for legal infringements. (Note 94) It is but common sense that everything we do has effects (some intended, 
others unintended), especially where the means employed are alien to the conventional. Laws especially bad 
ones cannot therefore immune protesters from punishment. For the most part, protesters are not protected, given 
that civil disobedience typically involves an illegal activity. (Note 95) Indeed, civil disobedience is always 
something that can send one to jail. (Note 96) It is one thing to establish that people would be deterred with 
severe punishment. It is quite another to interpret that anticipation as a rule. As afore-stated, it is not uncommon 
for civil disobedient to embrace punishment as a tactic for the publicity of the campaign. Those who engage in 
civil disobedience may deliberately accept the punishment, may be coerced against their will but are actually 
under no obligation to accept the legal penalty. (Note 97) Both Professors Zinn and Dworkin have come to the 
conclusion that if the cause is morally justified, then it is morally justified to the very end. (Note 98) To 
wholeheartedly accept the government or societal injustice would only fuel more energy to foster the prevailing 
injustice. Protesters who accept punishment signify acceptance of the prevailing system by validating the 
assumption that we must always obey the law. (Note 99) 
Conclusion 
There seems to always be a good deal of distress expressed by those in authority each time the masses or a 
fraction thereof resolve to civil disobedience. This is graspable given that uprisings habitually threaten the very 
fabrics of the society. The stories of Antigone, Socrates, Thoreau, Gandhi, King, Malcolm X are certainly 
familiar to many of us today. They never had an easy or comfortable task. However, the steadfast commitment 
they invested on respective causes has won them an uncontested historical recognition as distinguished thinkers 
especially in those societies that they boldly challenged. This is not to suggest that the dust has finally settled on 
the concept of civil disobedience. Far from that, the notion is still almost as hotly contested as during any 
historical episode. There can be no denying the fact that situations of dire injustice tend to enjoy more public 
sympathy today than during any other historical episode. This compassion has however not translated into any 
universal legal right of civil disobedience in the face of injustice. 
Between Ordered Injustice and Ordered Liberty 
Every society is normally faced the threat of unlawful conduct. The normal rule is that all citizens should be law 
abiding, and dissenters made to pay accordingly for any infringements to the legal system. One thing that all 
societies, free and authoritarian have in common is the stringent requirement of political obligation to obey laws 
at all times. This leads us to an important problematic: should law be obeyed even where it protects an evil 
condition? This paper posits that this requirement must not be qualified as a hard and fast rule. It recognizes that 
where a society is rooted on unjust fabrics, breaking the law would be both desirable and justified. I do not 
intend to insinuate that one must resort to civil disobedience each time there is an element of injustice. That is 
not quite what I am advocating, because I am well aware that all societies at every point in time have deeply 
entrenched elements of systematic injustice. The only difference is that why some thread a committed path 
towards justice, others simply struggle to maintain their elitist status quo and or exacerbate the inequality gap. 
It also seems to me that in reality, those who first break the law are actually not the resisters but rather those who 
are bent on defending a brutally, oppressive unjust system. The resistance itself is merely a counteractive 
response to the blatant denial of justice and the unlawful methods used to degrade, torment and exclude them. 
When injustice is abundant, social tensions are equally ubiquitous and bound to explode at one point or another. 
An act of Civil disobedience merely epitomizes those crises in law enforcement.  It would seem that arguments 
insisting on the compulsory observance of laws (political obligation) at all times are used as a tactic rather than 
genuine respect to the legal order, because they are never backed with a corresponding requirement for laws to 
be just at all times. If an act contrary to conscience is clearly immoral and the government compels its 
observance, it would mean the state in question wants citizens to act immorally. (Note 100) Political obligation 
cannot reasonably be imagined in an imperfect or immoral setting nor should it coexist with an immoral injustice. 
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The expectation that a true democracy as “government of the people” is anchored on our “real will”, our “true 
morality” and our “true freedom” is incompatible with any other manifestation that exactly represents false 
morality. (Note 101) 
A civil disobedient is a conscientious law violator and moral idealist who conceives the law as necessarily 
anchored on morality and his conscience as a higher law. His actions are justified because the code of conduct 
“is out of harmony with the moral law.” (Note 102) The argument is in contradistinction with the political 
obligation to always obey the law. The bone of contention actually resides between the need to have ordered 
injustice versus the importance of guaranteeing ordered liberty. (Note 103) When law becomes alien to common 
sense, its moral rationale too becomes incomprehensible. Those arguing for political obligation are right when 
they assert that civil disobedience will lead to societal disruptions. This argument must not in any way be seen as 
contradicting or invalidating the raison-d’être of civil disobedience. It has been observed that freedom is never 
free. It must be demanded by the oppressed. (Note 104) The consequences of the so-called disruptions can hardly 
be as the degree of injustice inflicted by ordered injustice. (Note 105) 
At various sections of this paper, I have argued that resort to civil disobedience must be exercised with a lot of 
caution. In short, as much as possible, it should be limited to situations where the provocation for it is extreme. 
Given that civil disobedience is very dependent on one’s good conscience, it follows that there can be no “legal” 
right to break the law as such.  In other words, the right to civil disobedience must be “moral”, not legal. (Note 
106) It goes without saying that the goals of the campaign must themselves be moral. I cannot end without 
re-emphasizing the importance of caution for anyone contemplating civil disobedience. Conscience is a 
treacherous guide. Even Hitler acted according to his conscience. (Note 107) As Thomas Hobbes famously 
observed, a man may be convinced that God has commanded him to act in a particular way. God may have 
commanded other men to similar beliefs. Consequently, the man who chooses to disobey the law on principle 
may be a saint, but he may also be a madman. Whatever he is, his presence makes us painfully aware of our 
choices. (Note 108) 
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v. Virginia (1960). Many of the activists were arrested because the rides violated the local state laws which 
required segregation of the buses. Many of the buses also came under routine attacks from the Ku Klux Klan 
(KKK). The police refused to protect the victims or investigate the atrocities on the ground that those violating 
local laws did so as “outside agitators.”  
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Note 97. Schlesinger, ‘Civil Disobedience’ at 956 (Explaining the positions of Professors Howard Zinn.and 
Ronald Dworkin on this issue). 
Note 98. Zinn for instance has provided that ”If a specific act of civil disobedience is a morally justifiable act of 
protest, then the jailing of those engaged in that act is immoral and should be opposed, contested to the very 
end…To accept jail penitently as an accession to the rules is to switch suddenly to a spirit of subservience, to 
demean the seriousness of the protest.”         (See Howard Zinn, Disobedience and Democracy: Nine 
Fallacies on Law and Order (South End Press: Cambridge/Boston/New York, 2002) at 121). 
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Note 105. As one author has neatly put it: “the dissenter proposes to justify his disobedience by an appeal to the 
incompatibility between his political circumstances and his moral convictions. Usually, this requires that he be 
convinced that it would be worse for everyone to suffer the consequences of the objectionable law than it would 
be for everyone to suffer the consequences of his civil disobedience….” (Bedau, ‘on Civil Disobedience’ at 659). 
Note 106. Frank Johnson Jr., ‘Civil Disobedience and The Law’ at 276. 
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Note 108. cf. Frank Johnson Jr., ‘Civil Disobedience and The Law’ at 277 (With emphasis added). 
 
